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Will more aid help developing countries? The
answer to this question depends on our view of
states in developing countries. Two views prevail.
One view sees aid undermining government
accountability to citizens, propping up autocratic
regimes anddisappearing into the pockets of corrupt
officials.Another perspective sees aid contributing
crucial fiscal and administrative capacity that helps
governments better serve their people. In fact,
neither view is entirely right (or wrong). Increasing
aid enhances government capacity up to a point,
but aid can undermine legitimacy if it undermines
state accountability to citizens.
The cross-national statistical evidence shows
that increasing aid improves government capacity,
though the relationship starts to tail off at levels
higher than approximately 40 per cent of theGross
Domestic Product (GDP).The samedata also shows
that donor fragmentation contributes to government
incapacity. A close case study of Mozambique
confirms and deepens our understanding of these
processes. In Mozambique, improved donor
coordination and higher volumes of aid helped to
increase capacity, reduce transaction costs for
government and increase the government’s
accountability.
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Figure 1: Aid Substituting for Domestic Partnerships
To make these points, the current article uses
cross-national statistical evidence and that case
study. Cross-national statistical data was available
for the 1980s and 1990s from International
Monetary Fund (IMF) Government Finance
Statistics and Organisation for Economic Co-
operation andDevelopment (OECD)Development
Assistance statistics. Both sources are fairly reliable
and consistent, though the country coverage is less
than desirable.Nevertheless, panels of at least 105
countries are available for most years. To analyse
the data, dynamic panel data analysis compared
evidence across countries and over time.1 Themain
variables included in the analysis were the volume
of aid, donor fragmentation and tax effort.2 The
analysis of Mozambique was taken from a
Department for InternationalDevelopment (DFID)-
funded study in which the author had a role
(Hodges and Tibana 2004).
1 Aid and the state
The results obtained here follow from competing
and potentially contradictory notions of developing
country states. These notions provide an elegant
tension between those who would emphasise state
legitimacy and those who would emphasise state
capacity. As most observers recognise, both
legitimacy and capacity are core characteristics of
governance (DFID 2005).
The first statistical result follows from theories
of the state that focus on legitimacy. According to
these theories, states are (or ought to be) partners
with society. Together, they create a social contract
in which rulers and the ruled negotiate over
revenues, representation and services.3 If the state
does not depend on citizens for revenues, however
– as in the case of natural resource rich, or highly
aid-dependent states – the social contract is severed.
If governance depends on a social contract, we
would expect a downward slope when we predict
tax effort. Social contracts should be stronger at
lower levels of aid, ceteris parabis, but should decline
as aid substitutes for domestic partnerships. This
appears to be the case for aid above 40 per cent of
theGDP.At high levels, an increase in aid produces
a decrease of tax effort.
On the other hand, an alternative view sees rulers
as maximisers. To the best of their ability, rulers
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Figure 2: Aid Enhancing Government Capacity
respond to their citizens.4 Themain constraint they
face is not the strength of social contracts, but rather
the capacity of the state. Public administrations
with more resources, better technologies and
improved training do more than weak states.
From the state capacity perspective, we would
expect an upward sloping curve when we predict
tax effort.As aid increases, capacity should increase.
In fact, up to around 35 per cent of the GDP, an
increase in aid does create an increase in tax effort.
The point of these two figures is to say that there
is no single answer to the aid and governance
relationship. More aid increases government
capacity up to a point, but it cannot be allowed to
undercut social contracts with domestic actors.The
overall relationship between aid and governance,
therefore, is curvilinear. As aid volumes increase,
tax effort increases, but beyond a certain level, tax
effort begins to taper.
The key is apparently to increase capacity
without undercutting social contracts. One of the
causal mechanisms by which aid might undercut
social contracts is by increasing the transaction
costs of revenues. Accepting aid means recipient
governments must allocate staff for meetings,
comply with priorities on where to spend,manage
funds according to procedural conditions and report
their results. High levels of aid frequently come
with high numbers of donors, who follow each
other in a herd to the newest and latest developing
country favourite. The proliferation of donors that
ensues increases the burden on governments.They
use up scarce resources and time to negotiate and
comply with donors; salaries are driven upwards;
and the most capable bureaucrats are poached by
high-paying donor consultancies.The sheer volume
ofmoney and donors means that governments end
up being more accountable to donors and less
accountable to their own citizens or to internal
government accountability mechanisms such as
parliamentary oversight (Bräutigam 2000).
Other things being equal, we would expect that
high levels of donor fragmentation would weaken
government capacity. The measurement of donor
fragmentation is possible using an index of
concentration adapted from an index used to
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Figure 3: Aid and Governance
calculate the degree of concentration of firms in the
industrial sector. As expected, the impact of
fragmentation on tax effort is a downward slope.
More fragmentation weakens governance.
These statistical comparisons suggest quite
powerful results. Volumes of aid have a direct
relationship with governance in developing
countries, and so does donor behaviour. As aid
volumes increase, it contributes to government
capacity to serve citizens. Yet aid flows can undercut
the social contract between state and society by
substituting for government revenues or imposing
excessive transaction costs on government. Thus,
donors bear some responsibility for the quality of
governance in the South –more specifically – while
donors should increase volumes to a point, they
should also improve their behaviour.
2 Making aid better: Mozambique5
Mozambique is a classic case of aid dependence.
Since the end of civil war in 1992, donors have
offeredmassive aid to improve government capacity,
support development projects, and ensure peace.
In recent years, flows of aid have been equal to
approximately half of public expenditure; and in
some sectors such as health (69 per cent) and roads
and water (75 per cent), external support accounted
for even higher proportions.
2.1 The problem
The massive inflow of aid has provided necessary
capacity and pushed forward reforms that
strengthen public sector institutions, improve the
climate for private investment and promote growth.
On the other hand, aid has damaged governance
by undercutting accountability relationships and
state capacity.Accountability is undermined by the
impression that policies belong to donors and not
to government or society. Capacity is undermined
by the volatile and unpredictable flows of aid that
are encumbered by a confusing array of conditions,
procedures and reporting requirements.
The particular aid modality that has been
dominant inMozambique as inmost parts ofAfrica
is project assistance. Project assistance is usually
negotiated directly between donors and line
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Figure 4: Transaction Costs and Governance
ministries, or individual directorates or departments
within them. Often, projects are associated with
special project units that are poorly integrated into
existing directorates or departments of ministries.
These units poach personnel by paying salaries far
higher than normal civil service scales and operate
according to independent schedules. The funds
disbursed are often off-treasury, if not entirely off-
budget.
The implications of project assistance for
accountability are severe. Lineministries lose their
ability tomanage sector-wide development strategies
as individual departments obtain greater autonomy.
In turn, ministries of finance and parliament lose
their ability to control and oversee aggregate
government activity.
Thecapacity implications areno less dramatic.The
various donors introduce multiple conditionality
frameworks,management arrangements and reporting
requirements. The fragmented array of projects
disconnects planning, budgetingand implementation,
thus weakeningpublic financemanagement processes
that are already weak. Each project draws time,
personnel and resources away from mainstream
activities, and thosecivil servants that remain innormal
jobs suffer from limited resources, a sense of
comparative deprivation and low morale.
The emergence of common funds has helped to
mitigate some of these negative effects.Donors pool
their resources and establish a common framework
for reporting and reviewing performance, often
across an entire sector. Lineministries receive untied
resources and ideally, these resources are completely
on-budget.
Unfortunately, even common funds have left
some problems unresolved. Some replicate the
deficiencies of project financing, acting simply as
multi-donor project facilities or “basket funds”,
with some or all of the traditional vices of separate
project units,distorting salary levels and off-treasury
payment mechanisms.Ultimately, even sector-wide
common funds introduce rigidities and crowd out
other priorities.Domestic allocation decisions and
processes become sidelined as sector programmes
absorbmost of the budget.
2.2 Doing better
In response, many donors have begun to provide
general budget support (GBS). Though fiduciary
risks exist, thepotentialbenefits includegovernment-
wide ownership of the planning and resource
allocation process, strengthening domestic
accountability to parliament, and reducing
transaction costs associated with aid. InMozambique,
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Resources, 2003 (% of total resources)
Source: Mapa fiscal, MPF, June 2004.
GBS has expanded to encompass 15 donors (14
bilateral donors plus theWorldBank), who are now
known as theG15 ProgrammeAid Partners (PAPs).
TotalGBS was US$297m in 2002 andUS$277m in
2003.These figures includeGBS grants frombilateral
donors (US$175m in 2003) and loans (US$92m in
2003) – with Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) debt relief as a further benefit. (Multilateral
agencies – especially theWorldBank and theAfrican
Development Bank – provided GBS outside the
common donor framework, though it has been
incorporated for 2004.)
GBS is linked to a government and donor
dialogue that occurs in two meetings each year. In
these encounters, government and donors negotiate
the terms by which performance is to be assessed
and the latter commit to aid contributions.The first
meeting reviews previous performance, and donors
follow with their commitments for the following
year. In the secondmeeting,donors and government
set the framework for assessing future performance
and agree a disbursement schedule before the start
of the fiscal year.
The agreement between donors and government,
formally labelled aMemorandumofUnderstanding,
includes a “response mechanism” that establishes
a link between performance, commitments and
disbursements.
Improved accountability
GBS changes accountability relationships in several
ways. The dialogue between government and
donors establishes an assessment framework based
on targets and indicators that are regularly updated
and agreed among the Ministry of Finance, line
ministries and donors. Such explicit priority targets
createmore transparent and consensual evaluation
measures. These fall short of formal conditionality
for most donors and government now counts on
relatively predictable disbursements of funds.
Within government, the emergence ofGBS has
also partially reconfigured accountability
relationships. GBS funds are automatically on-
treasury and untied, adding to the resources
available for allocation in the budget formulation
process. This increases the role of the Ministry of
Finance within the budget process, increases the
potential link between plan, budget and
implementation and potentially enhances
parliament’s ability to oversee public intentions
through the budget process.
The increased role of the Ministry of Finance
also correlates with decreased autonomy of the line
ministries. They no longer receive as many funds
directly from donors, and increasingly they have
to depend onparliamentary and intra-governmental
processes to secure funds from the annual budget
and the government payment system. This can be
associated with greater insecurity and volatility of
funds for individual ministries, though as a whole
it encourages greater coordination amongministries
and closer links between planning directorates and
theMinistry of Finance.
Improved capacity
In addition to changing accountability relationships,
some of the most significant impacts ofGBS are in
the area of state capacity. GBS includes specific
investments in personnel and infrastructure capacity
for the planning and budgeting system. The hope
is that technology and capacity transfer can improve
links between stages of the budget cycle and
regularise disbursal of funds within the government
accounting system.
The dialogue between donors and government
further assists government capacity. As a result of
themeetings and the explicit principles of the system
established, programme aid is brought closer to
Mozambican instruments, processes and systems
of financial management. This assists government
in coordinating flows with domestic budgetary and
planning cycles and avoids some of the duplication
of duties that occur in long-term planning,
budgeting and implementation for aid programmes
and ordinary budgeting.
The dialogue and consensual agreement of
conditions allows donors to harmonise their
procedures,monitoring and reporting.This greatly
decreases the compliance costs for government and
cuts the uncertainty related to multiple donor
requirements. The conditions themselves can be
built into the capacity-building effort and structured
around platforms of improved financial
management.
Remaining issues
Despite the improvements, several accountability
and capacity constraints still trouble the authorities
inMozambique. The main beneficiary of the shift
in aid modalities is the ministry of finance, but as
a result it has found its technical and personnel
capacity burdened. Though the donors coordinate
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and limit their interactions to the biannual meetings,
each one continues to create significant transaction
costs for government, and these costs are now
concentrated more intensely on a single ministry.
(The line ministries must also prepare for these
meetings, and they continue to receive sector and
project funds, though at lower levels than before.)
So while the main objective of GBS is to put more
funds into formal domestic budget processes, it
does not eliminate the transaction costs associated
with obtaining funds. These costs are now directed
towards inter-ministerial and parliamentary
budgetary processes.
A genuinely new dynamic in the aid relationship
is created by GBS. The change is mainly evident in
the bargaining position of government and donors.
Already overwhelmed inmany respects, government
now faces a single front of donors negotiating as a
harmonised bloc withmassive technical resources.
The accountability that emerges through this
powerful pressure potentially overshadows
accountability to parliament and civil society. In
theory,donor performance assessment criteria could
be integrated – thus facilitating parliamentary
oversight – but this has not yet happened. More
commonly, the resulting impression is of the creation
of yet another “donor-driven” instrument.
Ultimately, the united donor front introduces
the risk of coordinated punishment. Given the
weight ofGBS within overall government resources,
the potential impact of a suspension ofGBS would
be devastating. On the other hand, we may hope
that the institution of negotiation and dialogue
establishes amechanism by which such sanctions
could be avoided andmore cooperative outcomes
obtained. For example, in 2001, complications over
semi-public banks arose, and a limited number of
GBS donors at the time halted payments.Quickly,
however, negotiations produced an agreement by
which aid could be resumed.
3 Conclusions
The evidence presented here supports the general
argument that more aid and better donor behaviour
can support improved governance in aid recipients.
Cross-national statistical evidence demonstrates
that tax effort increases with quite significant
increases in aid.This is associated with the enhanced
capacity that an influx of resources allows. At the
same time, this influx of resources cannot be allowed
to undercut the accountability relationships that
link state to society in a social contract. Massive
revenues that substitute completely for domestic
sources and high transaction costs that undercut
state capacity potentially undermine governance
in aid recipients. InMozambique, high levels of aid
enhanced capacity, but transaction costs associated
with project aid burdened government. The shift
to general budget support by an ever larger number
of donors has altered accountability relationships
within government and increased government
capacity.
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Notes
1. For details on the analysis, contact the author
a.schneider@ids.ac.uk. The techniques are described in
Bond (2002).
2. For adefinition andmeasurement of donor fragmentation,
see Acharya et al. (2004).
3. See Bates and Da-Hsiang (1985). Others see the
partnership as pernicious; dominant groups use the state
as an instrument to subordinate other groups. See
Lindblom (1977).
4. For a view of rulers as predators whomaximise rents, see
Levi (1988). For a view of rulers as benevolent dictators
whomaximise social welfare, seeMusgrave andMusgrave
(1989).
5. This section is adapted fromHodges and Tibana (2004),
section 4.2.
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